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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to prevent jurors from holding
defendants’ silence against them. In a trilogy of opinions, the Court concluded
that when a defendant refrains from testifying, (1) the prosecutor and judge cannot make adverse comments about that decision; (2) the judge can give a “no
adverse inference” instruction even over a defense objection; and (3) the judge
must give a “no adverse inference” instruction upon a defense request.
Conversely, the Court has never ruled that jurors can impeach their verdict
based upon jurors holding a defendant’s silence against him, and lower courts
have ruled against recognizing such a right to jury impeachment.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of juror racial bias in
reverse. In 2017, the Court ruled in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado that jurors must
be allowed to impeach their verdict based on jurors holding a defendant’s race
against him. But the Court has never held that there is a right to an implicit bias
jury instruction, and no lower court has ever recognized such a right.
In Pena-Rodriguez, however, the Supreme Court recognized that the right to
an impartial jury not only addresses “unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns,” but also requires “[a] constitutional rule.” Specifically, the
Pena-Rodriguez Court concluded that “[a] constitutional rule that racial bias in
the justice system must be addressed—including, in some instances, after the verdict has been entered—is necessary to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in
jury verdicts, a confidence that is a central premise of the Sixth Amendment trial
right.”
This Article contends that this rule must go further and address juror racial
bias on both the back end and the front end. For the same reasons that the
Supreme Court created the right to a jury instruction that jurors must not hold a
defendant’s silence against him, it should recognize the constitutional right to a
jury instruction that jurors must not hold a defendant’s race against him.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a public defender representing a Black man who does not testify at his trial for allegedly sexually assaulting a white woman.1 Which do you
fear more: (1) that the jury will draw adverse inferences from your client’s decision
not to testify, or (2) that the jury will draw adverse inferences from your client’s
race? If you chose option two, your fear does not align with the Supreme Court’s
precedent regarding jury instructions on adverse inferences. While the Court has
held that a defendant has the right to an instruction ordering jurors to avoid drawing adverse inferences from the defendant’s silence, the vast majority of courts
have held that a defendant does not have the right to an instruction advising jurors
to avoid drawing adverse inferences based on the defendant’s race.
Conversely, imagine you are a judge hearing an appeal based upon jury misconduct after the Black man is convicted of sexual assault. Which allegation do you

1. These facts are drawn from the case of Ronnie Long, which the author investigated for the Undisclosed
podcast. See State v. Ronnie Long, Episode 1: Brilliant Disguise, UNDISCLOSED (March 12, 2018), https://
undisclosed-podcast.com/episodes/ronnie-long/episode-1.html. In 1976, Long, a Black man, was convicted of
sexually assaulting a white woman by an all-white jury in Concord, North Carolina. In 2020, he was exonerated.
See Ken Otterbourg, Ronnie Long, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (last updated May 4, 2021), https://www.
law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5801.

352

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:349

think should provide a stronger basis for allowing jury impeachment: (1) that jurors
drew adverse inferences from the defendant’s decision not to testify, or (2) that
jurors drew adverse inferences from the defendant’s race? Here, if you chose
option two, your choice would align with precedent regarding jury impeachment.
While all courts have held that there cannot be jury impeachment based on allegations that jurors drew adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence, the Supreme
Court recently held that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury requires
jury impeachment based on allegations that a jury verdict was tainted by racial bias
during deliberations.
This Article argues that there is an untenable disequilibrium in these two scenarios that should be corrected through courts concluding that the Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury entitles defendants to implicit bias jury instructions. In
other words, it contends that there is a constitutional right to an implicit bias jury
instruction. Part I of this Article surveys the law surrounding the Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury and implicit bias instructions. Part II analyzes the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, including a
defendant’s entitlement to a “no adverse inference” instruction.
Part III makes the argument for a constitutional right to an implicit bias jury
instruction. In Subsection B, the Article argues that the strongest support for such a
right is the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado that
defendants have a right to present post-verdict evidence of juror racial bias during
deliberations. In Subsection C, it notes that the arguments that courts have made
against the right to an implicit bias jury instruction are the same arguments that the
Supreme Court rejected in recognizing the right to a “no adverse inference”
instruction. Finally, in Subsection D, the Article addresses alternate grounds for a
more limited Sixth Amendment right to an implicit bias jury instruction.
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY AND THE IMPLICIT BIAS
INSTRUCTION
This Section explores both the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and
precedent regarding the possible existence of a constitutional right to an implicit
bias jury instruction.
A. An Introduction to Implicit Bias
Explicit bias is bias that is “conscious, expressed, and often willingly
embraced.”2 Specifically, someone with explicit racial bias is aware that they judge
people by the color of their skin.3 For example, a person who harbors explicit racial
2. Kristin Henning, Race, Paternalism, and the Right to Counsel, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 652 (2017)
(citing Andrea D. Lyon, Racial Bias and the Importance of Consciousness for Criminal Defense Attorneys, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 755 (2012)).
3. Michele Benedetto Neitz, Pulling Back the Curtain: Implicit Bias in the Law School Dean Search Process,
49 SETON HALL L. REV. 629, 655–56 (2019).
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bias against Black people knows and maybe even embraces the fact that he
believes “that Blacks are aggressive, lazy, and worthless, and Whites are virtuous,
hard-working, and valuable.”4
Conversely, “[i]mplicit bias differs from explicit bias because it is not as easily
identifiable, even by the person holding the biased beliefs.”5 An implicit bias is “an
association or preference that is not consciously generated and is experienced without awareness.”6 For instance, a person who watches distorted media depictions of
Black people might unconsciously associate members of that racial group with
traits such as violence and criminality.7 Disturbingly, “[b]ecause these associations
are unconscious, and are ‘activated involuntarily,’ they can ‘affect our understanding, actions and decisions’ even when we do not realize it.”8
Empirical evidence from “social science studies show[s] that implicit bias is pervasive in our society.”9 With regard to attorneys, studies indicate that implicit
“biases may affect our eye contact, seating distance, and how frequently we smile
when interviewing clients and witnesses.”10 Moreover, “[b]oth jurors and judges
appear to be as susceptible to implicit bias as others are.”11 Specifically, experiments show that implicit biases impact several key components of jury decisionmaking, including “evaluation of evidence; recall of facts; and the forming of decisions and judgments, including judgments of guilt.”12 In one experiment, “mock
jurors remembered aggression-related case facts more accurately when faced with
an aggressive [B]lack actor than when faced with an aggressive white actor.”13 As
a result, many have noted the need to address implicit bias in the judicial system.14

4. Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith & Danielle M. Young, Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of
Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 520–21
(2014).
5. Neitz, supra note 3, at 656.
6. Id. (quoting J. Bernice B. Donald & Sarah E. Redfield, Framing the Discussion, in ENHANCING JUSTICE:
REDUCING BIAS 5, 14 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017)).
7. Sonja C. Tonnesen, “Hit it and Quit It”: Responses to Black Girls’ Victimization in School, 28 BERKELEY
J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1, 16–21 (2013).
8. Neitz, supra note 3, at 656 (quoting Understanding Implicit Bias, OHIO STATE U. KIRWAN INST., https://
kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/article/understanding-implicit-bias (last visited Nov. 23, 2021)).
9. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge
Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149,
154–58 (2010).
10. Andrea A. Curcio, Addressing Barriers to Cultural Sensibility Learning: Lessons from Social Cognition
Theory, 15 NEV. L.J. 537, 550–51 (2015).
11. Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony: Prior Conviction Impeachment
and the Fight Against Implicit Stereotyping, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 862 (2016).
12. Id. at 867.
13. Id. at 867 n.204 (citing Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decision-Making
and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 398–401 (2007)).
14. See, e.g., Melissa L. Breger, Making the Invisible Visible: Exploring Implicit Bias, Judicial Diversity, and
the Bench Trial, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039, 1052 (2019).
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B. The Sixth Amendment Right to an Impartial Jury
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides one line of
protection from both explicit and implicit bias. In pertinent part, the Sixth
Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”15 The Supreme Court has
held that the Sixth Amendment grants defendants the right to trial by jury “in order
to prevent oppression by the Government.”16 Specifically, the right to a jury trial
provides the accused “an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”17
There are several protections in place to safeguard the Sixth Amendment right
to an impartial jury. For example, in Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held
that the right to an impartial jury requires a jury that is selected from a jury pool
that represents a fair cross-section of the community.18 Furthermore, the Sixth
Amendment requires that courts allow defendants to exercise unlimited “for cause”
challenges to biased prospective jurors, including racist prospective jurors, to safeguard the right to an impartial jury.19
Although the Sixth Amendment only mentions an accused’s right to an “impartial jury,” the Supreme Court has held that the right also encompasses the right to a
competent jury.20 Therefore, if, for instance, a juror claims during trial that he was
being “harassed” by voices in his head that might have been spying in favor of the
defendant, a lack of inquiry into the juror’s sanity would deprive the defendant of
his right to a competent jury.21
C. The Implicit Bias Jury Instruction
This Section will review: (1) different proposed formulations of the implicit bias
instruction; (2) courts’ reluctance to recognize a constitutional right to an implicit
bias jury instruction; and (3) courts’ treatment of the somewhat similar sympathy/
prejudice jury instructions.
1. Different Proposed Formulations of the Implicit Bias Instruction
In order to further safeguard the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury,
some judges have begun giving jury instructions on implicit bias at the close of

15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
17. Id. at 156.
18. 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
19. See, e.g., State v. Urrea, 421 P.3d 153, 155 (Ariz. 2018) (interpreting United States v. Martinez-Salazar,
528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000)) (noting that “for cause” challenges, unlike peremptory challenges, have a
“constitutional dimension”).
20. McIlwain v. United States, 464 U.S. 972, 975 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
21. See Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465, 466–67 (2d Cir. 1980).
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criminal cases.22 For instance, Judge Mark W. Bennett of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Iowa gives the following instruction to jurors:
As we discussed in jury selection, growing scientific research indicates each
one of us has “implicit biases,” or hidden feelings, perceptions, fears and stereotypes in our subconscious. These hidden thoughts often impact how we
remember what we see and hear and how we make important decisions. While
it is difficult to control one’s subconscious thoughts, being aware of these hidden biases can help counteract them. As a result, I ask you to recognize that
all of us may be affected by implicit biases in the decisions that we make.
Because you are making very important decisions in this case, I strongly encourage you to critically evaluate the evidence and resist any urge to reach a
verdict influenced by stereotypes, generalizations, or implicit biases.23

Furthermore, Professor Cynthia Lee has proposed a “race-switching” instruction
that asks jurors to consider whether their vote would be the same if the races of the
victim and the defendant were switched.24 California also has an “implicit bias”
jury instruction in its “Forms of Jury Instruction.”25
These three jury instructions are included as examples in the “Achieving an
Impartial Jury (AIJ) Toolbox” published by the Section on Litigation of the
American Bar Association.26 The American Bar Association created the AIJ project to “focus[] on implicit bias in the context of the jury system and offer[] tools to

22. Jennifer K. Elek & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Can Explicit Instructions Reduce Expressions of Implicit Bias?
New Questions following a Test of a Specialized Jury Instruction at 4 (Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, 2014), http://
perma.cc/ZZD4-XD73.
23. Bennett, supra note 9, at 169 n.85.
24. CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM
224–25 (2003).
25. The implicit bias jury intrusction is as follows:
Each one of us has biases about or certain perceptions or stereotypes of other people. We may be
aware of some of our biases, though we may not share them with others. We may not be fully
aware of some of our other biases.
Our biases often affect how we act, favorably or unfavorably, toward someone. Bias can affect
our thoughts, how we remember, what we see and hear, whom we believe or disbelieve, and how
we make important decisions.
As jurors you are being asked to make very important decisions in this case. You must not let bias,
prejudice, or public opinion influence your decision. You must not be biased in favor of or against
any party or witness because of his or her disability, gender, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, national origin, [or] socioeconomic status[, or [insert any other impermissible form of
bias]].
Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence presented. You must carefully evaluate the evidence and resist any urge to reach a verdict that is influenced by bias for or against any party or
witness.
See Judicial Council of Ca. Civil Jury Instruc. § 113 (2012), https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/docs/caci/
100/113/.
26. AM. BAR ASS’N, ACHIEVING AN IMPARTIAL JURY (AIJ) TOOLBOX 20–22 (2017), https://assets.
documentcloud.org/documents/3864904/Achieving-an-Impartial-Jury-Toolbox.pdf.
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address its impact.”27 Among the tools are these three jury instructions as well as
the AIJ’s own “implicit bias” jury instruction.28 While the ABA has recognized the
importance of an implicit bias jury instruction, as will be seen in the next
Subsection, courts have been reluctant to recognize a right to such an instruction.
2. Courts’ Reluctance to Recognize a Right to an Implicit Bias Instruction
While Judge Bennett routinely uses his implicit bias jury instruction,29 other judges
have refused defendants’ request for similar instructions. Indeed, many federal courts
and the majority of state courts have found that a judge is not obligated to give an
implicit bias instruction despite the defendants’ request.30 A recent opinion of the
Supreme Court of Kansas provides a good illustration of this phenomenon.
In State v. Nesbitt, Kasey Nesbitt was charged with felony murder, rape, and
related crimes based upon his alleged fatal attack upon a 100-year-old victim in
her home.31 The victim was white, and Nesbitt was Black.32 At the close of the

27. Id. at 2.
28. The AIJ’s proposed implicit bias instruction states:
Our system of justice depends on judges like me and jurors like you being able and willing to
make careful and fair decisions. Scientists studying the way our brains work have shown that, for
all of us, our first responses are often like reflexes. Just like our knee reflexes, our mental responses
are quick and automatic. Even though these quick responses may not be what we consciously
think, they could influence how we judge people or even how we remember or evaluate the
evidence.
Scientists have taught us some ways to be more careful in our thinking that I ask you to use as you
consider the evidence in this case:
� Take the time you need to test what might be reflexive unconscious responses and to reflect carefully and consciously about the evidence.
� Focus on individual facts, don’t jump to conclusions that may have been influenced by unintended stereotypes or associations.
� Try taking another perspective. Ask yourself if your opinion of the parties or witnesses or of the
case would be different if the people participating looked different or if they belonged to a different group?
� You must each reach your own conclusions about this case individually, but you should do so
only after listening to and considering the opinions of the other jurors, who may have different
backgrounds and perspectives from yours.
Working together will help achieve a fair result.
Id. at 17–20.
29. See Elek & Hannaford-Agor, supra note 19, at 4 (“Judge Mark Bennett . . . has already created and
regularly uses his own implicit bias jury instructions.”).
30. See State v. Nesbitt, 417 P.3d 1058, 1069. (Kan. 2018) (“The majority of state courts addressing the issue
[of implicit bias jury instruction] have followed the same pattern. Some have reasoned that the instruction could
inject racial bias into a proceeding where none existed before . . . . Others have rejected such instructions because
there had been no indication a jury’s verdict reflected racial bias or simply because the instructions were not
required.”) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Jahagirdar v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 2d 198, 204 (D. Mass. 2009);
United States v. Graham, 680 F. App’x 489, 492–93 (8th Cir. 2017).
31. 417 P.3d at 1061.
32. Id. at 1063.
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case, Nesbitt asked for a version of the “race switching” instruction. This instruction would have told the jury:
It is natural for human beings to make assumptions about the parties and witnesses in any case based on stereotypes. Often we may rely on stereotypes
without even being aware that we are doing so. As a juror you must not make
assumptions about the parties and witnesses based on their membership in a
particular racial group. You must not assume that a particular interpretation of
a person’s behavior is more or less likely because the individual belongs to a
particular racial group. Reliance on stereotypes in deciding real cases is prohibited because every accused is entitled to equal protection of the law, and
because racial stereotypes are historically, and notoriously, inaccurate when
applied to any particular member of a race.
To ensure that you have not made any unfair assessments based on racial
stereo types, you should apply a race-switching instruction exercise to test
whether stereotypes have affected your evaluation of the case. ‘Race
Switching,’ involves imagining the same events, the same circumstances, the
same people, but switching the races of the particular witnesses. For example,
if the accused is African-American and the accuser/victim is white, you
should imagine a White accused and a black accuser/victim.
If your evaluation of the case is different after engaging in race-switching, this
suggests a subconscious reliance on stereotypes. You must then reevaluate the
case from a neutral, unbiased perspective.33

The trial judge refused to give this instruction, and the jury ultimately convicted
Nesbitt on all of the charges.34 In addressing Nesbitt’s ensuing appeal, the
Supreme Court of Kansas began by noting that Nesbitt had not pointed to a
“Kansas case in which the requested instruction has been given, and we have not
found one.”35 That said, the court noted that there was ample state and federal precedent dealing with the issue of whether to use special jury instructions to combat
racial bias.36
First, the Supreme Court of Kansas in Nesbitt observed that a federal statute, 18
U.S.C. § 3593(f), addresses juror bias in the sentencing phase of a capital case.37
Under that statute, (1) the judge must instruct the jury that “it shall not consider the
race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim;” and (2) the jury must “return to the court a certificate, signed by each juror,
that consideration of the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the
defendant or any victim was not involved in reaching his or her individual

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1068–69.
Id. at 1068.
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decision.”38 The Nesbitt Court, however, pointed out that this statute only applies
in the sentencing phase of a capital case and never applies at the guilt/innocence
phase.39
Second, the Nesbitt Court found that “[o]utside the federal death penalty context, federal courts that have examined the issue of whether to give instructions
that highlight possible racial prejudice have rejected them.”40 As support, the court
cited to opinions by federal courts offering differing reasons for rejecting implicit
bias jury instructions.41 For example, in Jahagirdar v. United States, the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that defense counsel’s
choice not to request instructions addressing specific prejudices was not unreasonable because it “might unnecessarily draw attention to the racial differences
between the defendant and the alleged victim.”42 And, in United States v. Graham,
the Eighth Circuit found that the district court did not have to give such an
instruction because “[a] district court has broad discretion to formulate jury
instructions.”43
Third, the Nesbitt court noted that “[t]he majority of state courts addressing the
issue have followed the same pattern.”44 Again, the court cited cases from different
jurisdictions with different rationales for refusing to give implicit bias jury instructions, including (1) worrying about injecting racial bias into a proceeding where
none existed before, (2) the lack of indication that the jury’s verdict would reflect
racial bias, and (3) the lack of a statutory or constitutional requirement to give such
an instruction.45
The Nesbitt court was only able to find one case—State v. Plain—in which an
appellate court found error in the failure to give an implicit bias jury instruction,46
and even that case does not state that a court must give such an instruction upon
request. In State v. Plain, Kelvin Plain was charged with first degree harassment.47
At the close of the evidence, Plain requested the following jury instruction:
Reach your verdict without discrimination. In reaching your verdict, you must
not consider the defendant’s race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or
sex. You are not to return a verdict for or against the defendant unless you
would return the same verdict without regard to his race, color, religious
belief, national origin, or sex.48

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

18 U.S.C. § 3593(f).
Nesbitt, 417 P.3d at 1068.
Id.
Id.
597 F. Supp. 2d 198, 204 (D. Mass. 2009).
680 F. App’x 489, 492 (8th Cir. 2017).
Nesbitt, 417 P.3d at 1068.
Id. at 1068–69.
Id. at 1069.
898 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Iowa 2017).
Id. at 816.
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The trial judge refused to give this instruction because he believed that he lacked
authority from the Supreme Court of Iowa to give it.49 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Iowa noted that the trial judge was mistaken because “Iowa law permits
—but does not require—cautionary instructions that mitigate the danger of unfair
prejudice.”50 As a result, the Supreme Court of Iowa found that the trial judge
abused his discretion, not because he was obligated to give the implicit bias
instruction, but because he improperly believed he lacked the authority to give it.51
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Kansas in Nesbitt did not agree with the
Supreme Court of Iowa in Plain that an implicit bias instruction could be given.
Instead, it rejected the instruction “suggested by Nesbitt because it c[ould not] be
squared with Kansas law.”52
3. The Sympathy/Prejudice Instruction
The conclusion in Nesbitt makes sense given a prior opinion of the Supreme
Court of Kansas dealing with a more generic jury instruction that arguably covers
implicit bias. In State v. Sully, James Sully was charged with second degree murder, and, over his objection, the prosecution introduced gruesome photos of the
deceased.53 Thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s request for a sympathy/
prejudice instruction, which would have instructed the jury to consider “the case
without favoritism, sympathy or prejudice for or against a party.”54 In affirming
this decision on appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that:
Our state committee on pattern jury instructions points out that a cautionary
type instruction on consideration of the case without favoritism, sympathy or
prejudice for or against a party is objectionable because it tells the jury what
not to do rather than what to do and it recommends that none be given unless
there are very unusual circumstances.55

The court did hold that granting such an instruction would not have been erroneous
and added that such an instruction is simply not required.56 The Supreme Court of
Kansas, however, has since held that such an instruction should only be given in
“very unusual circumstances,” such as when the jurors could have been unduly

49. Id. at 817.
50. Id. at 816.
51. Id. at 817.
52. State v. Nesbitt, 417 P.3d 1058, 1069 (Kan. 2018). According to the court, jurors are to decide cases based
upon the evidence and “are not to imagine another set of facts and then allow that imagination to affect their
deliberations.” Id.
53. 547 P.2d 344, 348 (Kan. 1976) (“One photo show[ed] the victim’s bloody face with one eye shot out and
his left upper chest; one depict[ed] the right side of the body and the right arm; the other [wa]s of the lower left
part of the body.”).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 348–49.
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sympathetic to the victim because she “was too ill with cancer to testify in the
courtroom.”57
The authors of the American Jurisprudence chapter on “Instruction on disregarding emotions; sympathy” agree with the Kansas approach, stating that: (1) “[i]
n criminal cases, where appropriate, the court should grant a request for an instruction warning the jury against allowing either sympathy or prejudice to influence
the verdict, although the court has the discretion to refuse it”; but (2) “[t]he better
practice is that a precautionary instruction regarding considering the case without
sympathy should not be given unless there are unusual circumstances.”58
Examples of courts exercising this discretion in both directions can be seen
across the country. For example, a New Jersey judge refused to instruct the jury
that they should decide a case without bias, prejudice, or sympathy after defense
counsel informed the judge that the victim’s daughter was crying loudly in the
courtroom.59 Similarly, an Indiana judge declined to give a similar instruction in a
reckless homicide case in which the judge allowed the State to introduce a photo of
the victim’s body after a fatal car accident but did not allow the photograph to be
published to the jury.60 And a Texas judge rejected this type of instruction in a capital murder trial in which the State introduced medical records graphically detailing
the victim’s injuries.61 Conversely, in a California case, the judge instructed the
jury “not to let bias, sympathy, or prejudice influence its decision” after the prosecutor referenced the victim’s pregnancy.62
Meanwhile, in some cases, judges have found that general sympathy/prejudice
instructions obviate the need for specific implicit bias jury instructions.63 For
example, in United States v. Diaz-Arias, the defendant requested the following
instruction: “It would be improper for you to consider, in reaching your decision as
to whether the government sustained its burden of proof, any personal feelings you
may have about the defendant’s race or ethnicity, or national origin, or his or any
witness’ immigration status.”64

57. State v. Williams, 329 P.3d 420, 425 (2014) (citing State v. Rhone 548 P.2d 752 (1976)).
58. 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 1167, Westlaw (database updated 2019).
59. See State v. Pagan, No. 94-9-03084, 2009 WL 2743195, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 1, 2009).
60. See Brief of Appellee, Whitaker v. State, No. 26A04-0204-CR-164 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2002), 2002
WL 33935874, at *3. The Court of Appeals of Indiana later reversed the defendant’s conviction on another
ground, obviating the need to determine whether the failure to give the instruction was erroneous. See Whitaker
v. State, 778 N.E.2d 423, 424 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
61. See Curtis v. State, 89 S.W.3d 163, 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
62. People v. Carroll, No. B251834, 2015 WL 1951894, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015).
63. An early example of this can be seen in the 1963 opinion in State v. Shepard, 124 N.W.2d 712, 719–20
(Iowa 1963), in which the Supreme Court of Iowa found that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s
request for a race switching jury instruction because the trial judge gave a sympathy/prejudice instruction. The
race switching instruction would have informed the jury that “[i]t is the duty of the jury to consider the
defendant’s case as if she were a white woman, for the law is the same as to both white and colored women, there
being no distinction in principles in respect to color.” Id. at 719.
64. 717 F.3d 1, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2013).
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The trial judge rejected this specific instruction and instead gave a more general
instruction, which included the following language:
You should determine what facts have been shown or not based solely on a
fair consideration of the evidence. That proposition means two things, of
course. First of all, you’ll be completely fair-minded and impartial, swayed
neither by prejudice, nor sympathy, by personal likes or dislikes toward anybody involved in the case, but simply to fairly and impartially judge the evidence and what it means.65

In rejecting the defendant’s ensuing appeal, the First Circuit found that the thrust
of his requested instruction was substantially covered in the sympathy/prejudice
instruction given by the trial judge.66
D. Conclusion
While some judges routinely give an implicit bias jury instruction, most federal
and state courts have found that there is no constitutional right to such an instruction. Furthermore, while courts can give general sympathy/prejudice instructions,
most courts refuse to give these instructions barring unusual circumstances.
Finally, some courts have found that general sympathy/prejudice instructions obviate the need for specific implicit bias jury instructions.
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND “NO
ADVERSE INFERENCE” INSTRUCTIONS
While courts consistently have held that there is no constitutional right to an
implicit bias jury instruction, the Supreme Court has reached the opposite conclusion about the right to a jury instruction regarding a defendant’s silence at trial.
This Section deals with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and the constitutional right to a “no adverse inference” instruction for non-testifying defendants.
A. Introduction
In pertinent part, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states
that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.”67 At a criminal trial, a defendant can invoke this privilege against selfincrimination and choose not to testify in his defense.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 23–24.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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B. Griffin v. California: Can the Prosecutor or Judge Make Adverse Comments
About the Defendant’s Decision Not to Testify?
In its 1965 opinion in Griffin v. California, the United States Supreme Court had
to decide whether an adverse comment by a judge or prosecutor on a defendant’s
failure to take the stand violates the Fifth Amendment.68 Eddie Dean Griffin was
charged with first degree murder in connection with the death of Essie Mae
Hodson and chose not to testify in his defense.69 Subsequently, during closing
arguments, the prosecutor said, inter alia, “Essie Mae is dead, she can’t tell you
her side of the story. The defendant won’t.”70
The jury thereafter found Griffin guilty and gave him the death penalty.71 Griffin
then appealed, claiming the prosecutor’s comment violated his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.72 His appeal later reached the United States
Supreme Court, which noted that, had the case been heard in federal court, the
prosecutor’s comments would have violated a congressional statute stating that a
defendant’s silence at trial “shall not create any presumption against him.”73 This
left the Court with the question of whether the prosecutor’s comments also violated
the Fifth Amendment in Griffin’s state court prosecution.74
The Court answered this question in the affirmative, finding that an adverse
comment on the defendant’s decision not to testify is a vestige of the “‘inquisitorial
system of criminal justice,’ . . . which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.”75 According
to the Court, an adverse comment “is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege” that “cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion
68. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
69. Id. at 609.
70. Id. at 611. The prosecutor’s full statement was:
The defendant certainly knows whether Essie Mae had this beat up appearance at the time he left
her apartment and went down the alley with her.
What kind of a man is it that would want to have sex with a woman that beat up if she was beat up
at the time he left?
He would know that. He would know how she got down the alley. He would know how the blood
got on the bottom of the concrete steps. He would know how long he was with her in that box. He
would know how her wig got off. He would know whether he beat her or mistreated her. He would
know whether he walked away from that place cool as a cucumber when he saw Mr. Villasenor
because he was conscious of his own guilt and wanted to get away from that damaged or injured
woman.
These things he has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain.
And in the whole world, if anybody would know, this defendant would know.
Essie Mae is dead, she can’t tell you her side of the story. The defendant won’t.
Id. at 610–11.
71. Id. at 611.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 612.
74. Id. at 613.
75. Id. at 614 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
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costly.”76 Furthermore, the Court rejected the State’s accompanying arguments
that (1) jurors would naturally and irresistibly draw an adverse inference from a
defendant’s refusal to testify; and (2) a prosecutor’s “comment on the failure does
not magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege.”77
Instead, the Court found a fundamental distinction between the jury possibly drawing such an inference on its own and “the court solemniz[ing] the silence of the
accused into evidence against him.”78
Finally, the Court “reserve[d] decision on whether an accused can require . . .
that the jury be instructed that his silence must be disregarded.”79
C. Lakeside v. Oregon: Over a Defense Objection, Can the Judge Instruct Jurors
Not to Hold the Defendant’s Refusal to Testify Against Him?
In the wake of Griffin, courts reached different conclusions on the question of
whether, upon the request of a non-testifying defendant, a judge must give a cautionary instruction, often referred to as a “no adverse inference” instruction.80
Before the Supreme Court resolved this split, however, it answered the inverse
question: Can a court give a “no adverse inference” instruction over the defense’s
objection?
In Lakeside v. Oregon, Ensio Lakeside was charged with escape in the second
degree after allegedly fleeing from a correctional institution.81 Lakeside did not
testify in his defense, and defense counsel asked the trial judge to refrain from giving a “no adverse inference” instruction.82 Over this objection, the judge instructed
the jury:
Under the laws of this State a defendant has the option to take the witness
stand to testify in his or her own behalf. If a defendant chooses not to testify,
such a circumstance gives rise to no inference or presumption against the defendant, and this must not be considered by you in determining the question of
guilt or innocence.83

After he was convicted, Lakeside appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the judge’s
actions violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.84
Lakeside’s appeal eventually reached the United States Supreme Court. First, the
Court held that the judge’s cautionary instruction did not violate the holding in
Griffin, which only dealt with adverse comments on a defendant’s failure to
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 615 n.6 (citation omitted).
80. See Brief for Petitioner, Carter v. Kentucky, No. 80-5060 (1980), 1980 WL 339742, at *25–*29 (laying
out the split among courts in the wake of Griffin).
81. 435 U.S. 333, 334 (1978).
82. Id. at 335.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 336.
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testify.85 According to the Court, “[i]t would be strange indeed to conclude that
this cautionary instruction violates the very constitutional provision it is intended
to protect.”86
Next, the Court addressed Lakeside’s argument that the jury might not notice a
defendant’s refusal to take the stand, which would render a judge’s curative
instruction tantamount to “waving a red flag in front of the jury.”87 In turning aside
this argument, the Court noted that it rested upon two dubious assumptions: “First,
that the jurors have not noticed that the defendant did not testify and will not, therefore, draw adverse inferences on their own; second, that the jurors will totally disregard the instruction, and affirmatively give weight to what they have been told
not to consider at all.”88 The Court then curtly concluded that “[f]ederal constitutional law cannot rest on speculative assumptions so dubious as these.”89
Furthermore, the Court held that acceptance of Lakeside’s argument still would
not be enough to establish a constitutional violation.90 Instead, the Court concluded
that “[t]he very purpose of a jury charge is to flag the jurors’ attention to concepts
that must not be misunderstood, such as reasonable doubt and burden of proof.”91
Lakeside also argued that the judge’s actions violated his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.92 The Court quickly dispensed with this argument, rejecting “the
proposition that the right to counsel, precious though it be, can operate to prevent a
court from instructing a jury in the basic constitutional principles that govern the
administration of criminal justice.”93 Therefore, even over a defense objection, a
judge can issue a “no adverse inference” instruction after a defendant decides not
to testify.
D. Carter v. Kentucky: Upon Request, Does a Judge Have to Issue a “No Adverse
Inference” Instruction?
This still left the Supreme Court with the question it kept open in Griffin: upon
the request of a non-testifying defendant, does the trial judge have to give a “no
adverse inference” instruction? The Court finally answered this question in its
1981 opinion in Carter v. Kentucky.94
In Carter, Lonnie Joe Carter was charged with third-degree burglary of Young’s
Hardware Store.95 Carter did not testify, and the defense asked the judge to give
the following instruction to the jury: “The [defendant] is not compelled to testify
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 338–39.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 339–41.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 342.
450 U.S. 288 (1981).
Id. at 290–91.
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and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should not
prejudice him in any way.”96 The judge refused to give this instruction, and the
jury returned a guilty verdict.97
Carter subsequently appealed, claiming that the refusal to give this “no adverse
inference” instruction violated the Fifth Amendment.98 That appeal eventually
reached the United States Supreme Court, which began by construing Lakeside as
holding that “[t]he salutary purpose of the instruction, ‘to remove from the jury’s
deliberations any influence of unspoken adverse inferences,’ was deemed so important that it there outweighed the defendant’s own preferred tactics.”99
The Court in Carter then observed that “[w]e have repeatedly recognized that
‘instructing a jury in the basic constitutional principles that govern the administration of criminal justice’ . . . is often necessary.”100 As an example, the Court cited
to its prior holding in Taylor v. Kentucky that the Due Process Clause requires jury
instructions on the presumption of innocence and the lack of evidentiary significance of an indictment.101 The Carter Court then reached a similar conclusion,
finding that “[a] trial judge has a powerful tool at his disposal to protect the constitutional privilege—the [no adverse inference] jury instruction—and he has an affirmative constitutional obligation to use that tool when a defendant seeks its
employment.”102
Finally, the Court rejected the State’s argument that other jury instructions were
sufficient for jurors to know that they could not draw adverse inferences from
Carter’s refusal to testify.103 Even though the failure to testify is not evidence and
the judge in Carter’s case instructed the jurors to decide “from the evidence alone,”
the Court concluded that jurors are not lawyers who understand the meaning of
“evidence;” rather, jurors “can be expected to notice a defendant’s failure to testify, and, without limiting instruction, to speculate about incriminating inferences
from a defendant’s silence.”104 Moreover, even though the judge instructed
Carter’s jury on the presumption of innocence, the Court held that while this presumption and the privilege against self-incrimination “are closely aligned,” they
also “serve different functions.”105 The Court thus concluded that the jury could
have derived “significant additional guidance” from a “no adverse inference”
instruction.106

96. Id. at 294.
97. Id. at 294–95.
98. Id. at 295.
99. Id. at 301.
100. Id. at 302 (citing Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 US 333, 342 (1978)).
101. Id. at 302 n.19 (citing Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978)).
102. Id. at 303.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 303–04.
105. Id. at 304.
106. Id.
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E. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has found that the Fifth Amendment precludes the judge
and/or the prosecutor from asking jurors to draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s decision not to testify. Moreover, the Court has concluded that, under the
Amendment, (1) judges must give a “no adverse inference” instruction upon
demand by the defense; and (2) judges can give such an instruction even over a
defense objection to ensure that jurors understand the basic constitutional principle
that is the privilege against self-incrimination.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN IMPLICIT BIAS JURY INSTRUCTION
A. Introduction
This Section argues that the Supreme Court should recognize a Sixth
Amendment right to an implicit bias jury instruction for the same reasons it found
a Fifth Amendment right to a “no adverse inference” instruction. In Subsection B,
it argues that the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado
supports the proposition that traditional rules regarding American juries must yield
more to the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury than the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. In Subsection C, it contends that the arguments against an implicit bias jury instruction are the same arguments against the
“no adverse inference” instruction that the Supreme Court has rejected. Finally, in
Subsection D, it concludes that, even if the Supreme Court declines to create a categorical right to an implicit bias jury instruction, it should at least create a more
limited right based upon other Supreme Court precedent.
B. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado
Generally, judges have discretion over whether to give jury instructions
requested by criminal defendants.107 In Carter v. Kentucky and Lakeside v.
Oregon, however, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) “‘instructing a jury in the
basic constitutional principles that govern the administration of criminal justice’
. . . is often necessary,” and (2) the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a basic and important enough constitutional principle to require judicial
issuance of a “no adverse inference” instruction if requested by a non-testifying
defendant.108
Therefore, if the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is as basic and important as the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Carter would
suggest that courts must similarly grant implicit bias jury instructions upon request.
107. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 467 S.E.2d 685, 696 (N.C. 1996) (“Turner is not authority for the
proposition that a trial court in the trial of an interracial crime must instruct the jury to disregard racial
considerations where defendant requests such an instruction.”); see also Thomas R. Ascik, For the Criminal
Practitioner, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465, 537 (1996).
108. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 298, 302 (citing Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 342 (1978)).
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This prompts the question of whether these constitutional protections are of equal
importance.
1. Pena-Rodriguez and the Elevation of the Sixth Amendment Right to an
Impartial Jury
One argument against a constitutional right to an implicit bias jury instruction
could be that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is not as important as
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The strongest rejoinder
to this argument is the United States Supreme Court’s 2017 opinion in PenaRodriguez,109 which dealt with jury impeachment, i.e., jurors testifying that their
verdict was tainted by misconduct. This Section will discuss the anti-jury impeachment rule of evidence and the Supreme Court’s key opinions finding that the rule is
not trumped by the Sixth Amendment right to a competent jury but is trumped by
the right to an impartial jury.
a. Rule 606(b)(1) and the General Prohibition on Jury Impeachment
The Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), Juror’s Comptenecy as Witness (“Rule
606(b)”), and its state counterparts govern jury impeachment.110 Federal Rule 606
(b)(1) states in pertinent part that: “During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict
or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that
occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or
another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or
indictment.”111
So, for instance, Rule 606(b)(1) would prevent jurors from impeaching their verdict by testifying that they violated the district court’s instruction not to discuss the
case among themselves prior to deliberations112 or considered testimony that the
judge struck from the record.113 The purposes of this Rule and its state counterparts
are to promote the “freedom of deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts, and
protection of jurors against annoyance and embarrassment.”114
b. Rule 606(b)(2) and the Exceptions to the Anti-Jury Impeachment Rule
Federal Rule 606(b)(2) contains exceptions to this anti-jury impeachment rule
for extraneous prejudicial information, improper outside influences, and mistakes

109. 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017).
110. 44 states have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in whole or great part. See, e.g., Stuart Ford,
Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal Courts, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 38 n.186 (2014) (citing
GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 2-3 (3d ed. 2013)).
111. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1).
112. See United States v. Morales, 655 F.3d 608, 629–32 (7th Cir. 2011).
113. See Bradford v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 90-0128, 1994 WL 118091 at *5 (9th Cir. 1994).
114. FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee’s note (citing McDonald v. Pless 238 U.S. 264 (1915)).
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in entering the verdict on the verdict form.115 These exceptions allow for jury
impeachment in cases in which, for example, (1) jurors looked up information
about a case online (the “Google mistrial”);116 (2) the victim’s brother bribed jurors
so that they would find the defendant guilty;117 or (3) the jury meant to award the
plaintiff $500, but the foreperson accidentally wrote $5,000 on the verdict form.118
c. Tanner and the Sixth Amendment Right to a Competent Jury
In cases in which these Rules-based exceptions do not apply, parties have sometimes tried to claim that their constitutional rights trump Rule 606(b), thereby
requiring jury impeachment. Such arguments usually fall on deaf ears. The classic
example of this futility can be found in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Tanner v.
United States.119 In Tanner, Anthony Tanner and William Conover were convicted
of conspiring to defraud the United States and mail fraud.120 After they were convicted, the defendants appealed, claiming that their Sixth Amendment right to a
competent jury was violated because (1) there was rampant alcohol and drug abuse
by jurors during trial; and (2) some jurors slept during trial.121
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the Justices quickly
concluded that these allegations were covered by Rule 606(b)(1) and were not a
proper predicate for jury impeachment.122 This left the defendants’ argument that
this rule of evidence had to yield to their Sixth Amendment right to a competent
jury.123
The Court turned this argument aside, noting that there were several safeguards
protecting the Sixth Amendment right to a competent jury.124 First, defense counsel can assess the competence of prospective jurors and use peremptory challenges
during jury selection.125 Second, the Court, court personnel, and counsel can
observe the jury during trial and report to the judge if a juror appears impaired.126
Third, jurors can observe their fellow jurors during trial and report misconduct during, but not after, trial.127 Finally, if a non-juror observes jury misconduct during

115. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2).
116. See John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html (“It might be called a Google mistrial.”).
117. See, e.g., State v. Domabyl, 272 N.W.2d 745, 747 (Minn. 1978) (noting that “Rule 606(b) would not
render a witness incompetent to testify to juror irregularities such as . . . acceptance of bribes”) (quoting 3
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE United States Rules § 606(04) (1985)).
118. See Kennedy v. Stocker, 70 A.2d 587, 587–88 (Vt. 1950).
119. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
120. Id. at 109–10.
121. Id. at 113.
122. Id. at 121–22.
123. Id. at 126.
124. Id. at 127.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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trial (e.g., a spectator sees a juror snorting a line of cocaine in the courthouse
bathroom), that non-juror can report the misconduct during trial and testify
to the misconduct after trial. 128 The Tanner Court thus held that “[i]n light of
these other sources of protection of petitioners’ right to a competent jury,”
the right to a competent jury did not trump Rule 606(b) and allow jury
impeachment. 129
d. Lower Court Extensions of Tanner
Courts have since applied Tanner to a variety of cases in which defendants have
claimed that their constitutional rights trump Rule 606(b). For instance, federal
courts have virtually unanimously held that the right to due process does not trump
Rule 606(b) when defendants seek to present evidence that jurors improperly discussed the merits of the case before the close of the evidence and the start of formal
deliberations.130
For purposes of this Article, the most salient extension of Tanner can be found
in cases in which a defendant seeks to present evidence that jurors drew adverse
inferences from the defendant’s decision not to testify. Courts have categorically
rejected such claims.131 For example, in State v. DeGrat, Robert DeGrat was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor child and lewd conduct with a minor child.132
DeGrat subsequently appealed and sought to have a juror testify “that the jury had
considered the fact that DeGrat had not testified at trial.”133
In rejecting this appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho noted that “[a]lthough
Tanner is not directly on point because it considers the Sixth Amendment and not
the Fifth Amendment, it gives us a framework within which to analyze DeGrat’s
constitutional claim in this case.”134 Under this framework, “[i]f DeGrat’s Fifth
Amendment privilege [wa]s protected by other aspects of the trial process,” the
application of Idaho Rule of Evidence 606(b) to preclude jury testimony was constitutional.135 The court then found this to be the case, “conclud[ing] that the jury
instruction not to consider a defendant’s failure to testify was sufficient to protect
DeGrat’s constitutional privilege not to testify.”136

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Larson v. State, 79 P.3d 650, 656-57 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Chavez, 744 F.3d 988, 997–98 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Rodriguez, 116 F.3d 1225, 1226–27 (8th Cir. 1997); Gleeton v. State, 716 So. 2d 1083, 1088–89 (Miss. 1998).
132. 913 P.2d 568, 569 (Idaho 1996).
133. Id. at 570.
134. Id. at 571.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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e. Pena-Rodriguez and the Elevation of the Sixth Amendment Right to an
Impartial Jury
There is, however, one situation in which the Supreme Court has held that a constitutional right trumps the anti-jury impeachment rule. In Pena-Rodriguez v.
Colorado, Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of unlawful sexual contact after a jury trial.137 Subsequently, defense counsel spoke to two jurors who
stated that, “during deliberations, another juror had expressed anti-Hispanic bias
toward [Pena-Rodriguez] and [Pena-Rodriguez’s] alibi witness.”138 These jurors
later submitted affidavits stating that another juror made statements such as, (1) “I
think he did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want”;
(2) in his experience, “nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being
aggressive toward women and young girls”; and (3) he did not find PenaRodriguez’s alibi witness credible because he was “an illegal.”139 The trial court,
however, found these affidavits inadmissible under Colorado Rule of Evidence
606(b), and the Supreme Court of Colorado later affirmed that opinion.140
In 2017, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[i]t must
become the heritage of our Nation to rise above racial classifications that are so
inconsistent with our commitment to the equal dignity of all persons.”141 The
Court reached this conclusion by surveying its prior precedent dealing with racial
animus, leading it to hold “that discrimination on the basis of race, ‘odious in all
aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.’”142 Specifically,
“[p]ermitting racial prejudice in the jury system damages ‘both the fact and the
perception’ of the jury’s role as ‘a vital check against the wrongful exercise of
power by the State.’”143
The Pena-Rodriguez Court then distinguished the racial prejudice in the case at
hand with the jury misconduct in Tanner, finding that:
“[R]acial bias implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional
concerns. An effort to address the most grave and serious statements of racial
bias is not an effort to perfect the jury but to ensure that our legal system
remains capable of coming ever closer to the promise of equal treatment under
the law that is so central to a functioning democracy.”144

The Court thus held that “[a] constitutional rule that racial bias in the justice system
must be addressed—including, in some instances, after the verdict has been
137.
138.
139.
Id.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 862. The alibi witness had “testified during trial that he was a legal resident of the United States.”
Id.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 868. (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)).
Id.
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entered—is necessary to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in jury verdicts, a
confidence that is a central premise of the Sixth Amendment trial right.”145
Consequently, the Court concluded “that where a juror makes a clear statement
that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal
defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give
way.”146
Pena-Rodriguez thus stands for the proposition that traditional rules regarding
American juries must yield more to the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury
than the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. While courts have
held that the preservation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege does not
trump Rule 606(b) and the sanctity and secrecy of jury deliberations, the PenaRodriguez Court concluded that the defendant’s right to an impartial jury is so important that it must trump the anti-jury impeachment rule when there is evidence
that racial bias impacted deliberations.
Of course, it is possible to make the inverse argument. Perhaps it is precisely
because defendants have the right to “no adverse inference” instructions that the
Fifth Amendment does not trump Rule 606(b). In other words, the right to this
instruction is arguably enough to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege, and
the lack of a right to an implicit bias instruction is why there needs to be an exception to the anti-jury impeachment rule when there is evidence of juror racial bias.
The Pena-Rodriguez opinion, however, belies such an argument. At the end of
its opinion, the Pena-Rodriguez Court observed that there were “standard and
existing processes designed to prevent racial bias in jury deliberations” that “can
help ensure that the [new] exception is limited to rare cases.”147 The example given
by the Court was that “[t]rial courts, often at the outset of the case and again in their
final jury instructions, explain the jurors’ duty to review the evidence and reach a
verdict in a fair and impartial way, free from bias of any kind.”148 The PenaRodriguez Court then noted that judges sometimes draft these instructions based
upon their personal experiences and that “[m]odel jury instructions likely take into
account . . . continuing developments and are common across jurisdictions.”149
Clearly, then, the Pena-Rodriguez Court did not view implicit bias jury instructions and the Sixth Amendment exception to Rule 606(b) for racial bias as mutually exclusive. Instead, the Court concluded that evolving jury instructions about
impartiality and bias can work symbiotically to prevent verdicts based on racial
bias on both the front and back ends. Of course, this ultimate conclusion means
that the Supreme Court must have made the intermediate conclusion that implicit
bias jury instructions do decrease racial bias during jury deliberations. Thus, the

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 869.
Id.
Id. at 871.
Id.
Id.
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Supreme Court’s opinion in Pena-Rodriguez can almost be seen as an endorsement
of the argument in this Article for a constitutional right to an implicit bias jury
instruction.
C. In Recognizing the Right to a “No Adverse Inference” Instruction, the
Supreme Court Rejected the Arguments Made Against an Implicit Bias
Instruction
In recognizing the right to a “no adverse inference” instruction in Carter and
finding that a judge can give this instruction even over defense counsel’s objection
in Lakeside, the Supreme Court rejected a number of arguments against such an
instruction. This Subsection will argue that the arguments made against the right to
an implicit bias instruction are the same arguments that were made against a “no
adverse inference” instruction and that they should be rejected for similar reasons.
Specifically, it will argue against courts claiming that (1) there is no constitutional
obligation to give such an instruction; (2) existing jury instructions are adequate to
address implicit bias; and (3) such an instruction might inject racial bias into a proceeding where none existed before and unnecessarily draw attention to the racial
differences between the defendant and the alleged victim.
1. No Constitutional Obligation to Give the Instruction
Some courts rejecting a constitutional right to an implicit bias jury instruction
have observed that judges generally have discretion over whether to give jury
instructions.150 The Carter Court addressed and rejected a similar argument leveled
against the right to a “no adverse inference” instruction. As noted, the Court in
Carter held that some constitutional principles, such as the presumption of innocence, are so basic and important as to require jury instructions.151 The Carter
Court then held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a
basic and important enough constitutional principle to require judicial issuance of
a “no adverse inference” instruction if requested by a non-testifying defendant.152
For the reasons stated in Section III.B.1, the Supreme Court should similarly
find that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is a basic and important
enough constitutional principle to require judicial issuance of an implicit bias jury
instruction. As the Court in Pena-Rodriguez held, the right to an impartial jury is a
basic and important enough constitutional principle to require impeachment of a
jury’s verdict if there is evidence it was tainted by racial bias.153 Conversely, as
noted, courts consistently have held that evidence that jurors used a non-testifying
defendant’s silence against him is not a sufficient basis for jury impeachment.154
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See State v. Sully, 547 P.2d 344, 348–49 (Kan. 1976).
Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 302 (1981).
Id. at 302–03.
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017).
See supra Section IIIB1.iv.
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Courts have reached similar conclusions about jurors failing to apply the presumption of innocence during deliberations.155 For instance, in Pederson v.
Fabian, a juror typed up a statement after finding Ryan Pederson guilty of seconddegree murder and related crimes; the juror stated, inter alia,
I wanted more from him presenting a defense. I know a person is supposed to
be innocent until proven guilty, but in reality it didn’t work that way. The
prosecutor presented overwhelming evidence that someone died. The defense
needed to present much more evidence that it wasn’t [Pederson] that caused
the death.156

Both the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court of Minnesota found that this evidence that a juror ignored or misunderstood the presumption of innocence was not
a proper factual predicate for jury impeachment under Rule 606(b).157 Specifically,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the juror’s statement was insufficient for
jury impeachment because it did “not indicate that she concealed a prejudice or
bias on voir dire.”158
In the wake of Pena-Rodriguez, courts have drawn an even sharper line between
biased jurors and jurors who ignore or misapply the presumption of innocence. In
United States v. Ewing, the foreperson came forward after the jury found the defendant guilty of a drug-related offense and stated that it was “‘very clear’ that ‘the
group as a whole did not presume the defendant was innocent until proven
guilty.’”159 After the district court found that the foreperson’s statement was inadmissible under Rule 606(b), the defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that
application of this rule violated his right to the presumption of innocence.160
The Sixth Circuit cited Pena-Rodriguez to find that the allegations of jury misconduct by the foreperson were “troubling and unacceptable.”161 But ultimately,
the court found that application of Rule 606(b) to preclude jury impeachment
regarding the presumption of innocence was constitutional because the foreperson’s allegations did “not fall into the exception for racial bias” recognized in
Pena-Rodriguez.162
In summation, it appears clear that in Pena-Rodriguez the Supreme Court elevated the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury above other constitutional
principles such as the presumption of innocence and the privilege against self155. See, e.g., Gleeton v. State, 716 So. 2d 1083, 1088–89 (Miss. 1998) (“The court also instructed the jury on
its duty to carefully weigh the evidence in reaching a verdict and on the presumption of innocence. Gleeton’s
contention that the jury failed to follow these instructions does not fall under the exceptions for investigating
‘extraneous prejudicial information’ or ‘outside influence’ on the jury under Rule 606(b).”).
156. 491 F.3d 816, 821 (8th Cir. 2007).
157. Id. at 821–22; State v. Pederson, 614 N.W.2d 724, 731 (Minn. 2000).
158. Pederson, 614 N.W.2d at 731.
159. 749 F. App’x 317, 321 (6th Cir. 2018).
160. Id. at 324–25.
161. Id. at 326.
162. Id.
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incrimination. While each of these latter two protections are significant, courts
have found that they are not important enough to allow for jury impeachment
when jurors have ignored or misunderstood them. Conversely, in Pena-Rodriguez,
the Supreme Court singled out the right to an impartial jury as a special right that
uniquely requires repudiation of a jury verdict tainted by racial bias. Therefore, the
right to an impartial jury is certainly basic and important enough to require an
implicit bias jury instruction as a matter of constitutional law.
2. The Sufficiency of Existing Jury Instructions
Some courts rejecting a constitutional right to an implicit bias jury instruction
have observed that such an instruction is unnecessary in cases in which some version of the sympathy/prejudice instruction referenced in Section III.B.1 is issued.
As noted in that Section, most courts only give this sympathy/prejudice instruction
in cases involving unusual circumstances.163 That said, if a court does give a sympathy/prejudice instruction, could that justify the non-issuance of an implicit bias
jury instruction?
As noted, the Supreme Court addressed a similar argument in Carter v.
Kentucky.164 In Carter, the State claimed that existing jury instructions on topics
such as the presumption of innocence and the lack of evidentiary significance of an
indictment obviated the need for a “no adverse inference” instruction.165 The
Supreme Court disagreed, finding that “[t]he other trial instructions and arguments
of counsel that the petitioner’s jurors heard at the trial of this case were no substitute for the explicit [no adverse inference] instruction that the petitioner’s lawyer
requested.”166 Specifically, the Carter Court concluded that “the Fifth Amendment
privilege and the presumption of innocence are closely aligned . . . [b]ut these principles serve different functions, and we cannot say that the jury would not have
derived ‘significant additional guidance’ . . . from the instruction requested.”167
While the Court did not spell out its reasoning, its logic seems clear. Here is one
typical formulation of the jury instructions on the lack of evidentiary significance
of an indictment and the presumption of innocence:
The defendant has been charged by the government with violation of a federal
law. He is charged with ________. The indictment is simply the description of
the charge made by the Government against the defendant; it is not evidence
of his guilt. The law presumes the defendant innocent. The presumption of
innocence means that the defendant starts the trial with a clean slate. In other
words, I instruct you that the defendant is presumed by you to be innocent
throughout your deliberations until such time, if ever, you as a jury are
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See supra Section III.B.1.
450 U.S. 288 (1981).
Id. at 302 n.19 (citing Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484-86 (1978)).
Id. at 304.
Id.
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satisfied that the government has proven him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, the presumption alone is sufficient to find the defendant not guilty.168

These instructions indirectly advise jurors about the privilege against self-incrimination. In other words, if jurors are told that they must begin deliberations with a
presumption of innocence, jurors could infer that they cannot draw an adverse inference, or presumption of guilt, from the defendant’s refusal to testify. Indeed,
some versions of the “no adverse inference” instruction tell jurors that they cannot
draw an adverse inference or “presumption of guilt” from the fact that a defendant
refrained from testifying.169 But while a jury instruction on the presumption of
innocence implies that jurors cannot draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s
refusal to testify, such an instruction is, in the words of the Carter Court, “no substitute for the explicit [no adverse inference] instruction.”170
This takes us to the question of whether the sympathy/prejudice instruction is a
pale substitute for an implicit bias instruction. As previously noted, one typical version of the sympathy/prejudice instruction informs jurors to consider “the case
without favoritism, sympathy or prejudice for or against a party.”171 Such an
instruction is generally given in the case of a sympathetic victim and/or an unsympathetic defendant,172 but the use of the word “prejudice” in the instruction could
be construed to cover any type of prejudice, including racial bias.
That said, as will be noted in more detail in infra Section III.D.1, the Supreme
Court itself has recognized a constitutionally meaningful difference between general questions about prejudice/bias and specific questions about racial bias in the
context of voir dire questions to prospective jurors before trial.173 Assuming the
same analysis that applies to the questioning of prospective jurors applies to the
instructing of trial jurors, then those trial jurors would, in the words of the Carter
Court, derive “significant additional guidance” from an implicit bias jury
instruction.174
3. The Lakeside Court’s Rejection of Two Assumptions About Jury Conduct
In rejecting a constitutional right to an implicit bias jury instruction, courts have
concluded that such an instruction might (1) inject racial bias into a proceeding
168. United States v. Walker, 861 F.2d 810, 813 n.14 (5th Cir. 1988).
169. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 797 A.2d 616, 643 n.23 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (“And no presumption of guilt
may be raised, and no adverse inference of any kind may be drawn from the fact that the defendant did not
testify.”); State v. Kempker, 824 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (“The jury, at the defendant’s request,
was instructed in accordance with MAI-CR 3d 308.14, which makes it clear that no presumption of guilt arises
and no adverse inference may be drawn if the defendant does not take the stand.”).
170. Carter, 450 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added).
171. State v. Sully, 547 P.2d 344, 348–49 (Kan. 1976)
172. See supra Section I.C.3.
173. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526–27 (1973).
174. Carter, 450 U.S. at 304 (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484 (1978)).
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where none existed before,175 and (2) “unnecessarily draw attention to the racial
differences between the defendant and the alleged victim.”176 In other words, these
courts have assumed that there could be cases in which jurors do not notice and
consider the respective races of the defendant and the victim and where issuing an
implicit bias jury instruction might therefore have a “boomerang effect,” whereby
these same jurors end up improperly considering race in rendering a verdict.
As noted, in Lakeside v. Oregon, the Supreme Court addressed and rejected the
defendant’s similar argument that a “no adverse inference” instruction would be
like “‘waving a red flag in front of the jury’” for two reasons.177 First, the Lakeside
Court held that the defendant’s argument was counterproductive because “[t]he
very purpose of a jury charge is to flag the jurors’ attention to concepts that must
not be misunderstood, such as reasonable doubt and burden of proof.”178 If, as
argued above,179 the right to an impartial jury is a concept that similarly must not
be misunderstood, courts should be required on request to issue an implicit bias
jury instruction.
Second, the Lakeside Court concluded that it could turn aside the defendant’s
“red flag” argument because it rested upon two untenable assumptions: (1) that
jurors did not already notice the lack of testimony by the defendant and would not
draw adverse inferences on their own, and (2) that jurors would disregard the “no
adverse inference” instruction and “affirmatively give weight to what they have
been told not to consider at all.”180
But were the two assumptions in Lakeside really untenable? And are the two
assumptions leveled against the implicit bias instruction even less tenable than the
Lakeside assumptions, providing an even stronger justification for a constitutional
right to an implicit bias jury instruction?
a. Assumptions About Jury Conduct Related to Defendants Not Testifying
i. Do Jurors Notice and Hold Defendants’ Decisions Not to Testify Against
Them?
The first assumption to test from Lakeside is whether jurors hold defendants’
decisions not to testify against them. And the best answer is: probably. In his article
The Silence Penalty, Professor Jeffrey Bellin notes that “[t]he social science literature, and particularly research by psychology professor David R. Shaffer, supports
the conclusion that jurors punish defendants for refusing to testify.”181 In one
175. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 296 So. 2d 678, 682 (Miss. 1974) (“Obviously this instruction was calculated to
inject an issue related to race.”).
176. See State v. Nesbitt, 417 P.3d 1058, 1069 (Kan. 2018).
177. 435 U.S. 333, 339–40 (1978).
178. Id. at 340.
179. See supra Section I.
180. Lakeside, 435 U.S. at 340.
181. Jeffrey Bellin, The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 408 (2018).
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experiment, Professor Shaffer staged a trial simulation in which “jurors” were presented with either: (1) a defendant who did not testify; (2) a defendant who testified, but refused to answer a potentially incriminating question during crossexamination; or (3) a defendant who testified normally without refusing to answer
any questions.182 Two-thirds of the jurors in groups 1 and 2 found the defendant
guilty, whereas “there were no guilty verdicts” in group 3.183
This result is facially compelling evidence of a “silence penalty,” but the
defendant’s testimony was favorable to him in group 3 in Professor Shaffer’s
study.184 Therefore, it is impossible to tell whether jurors were punishing the defendant in group 1 for remaining silent or rewarding the defendant in group 3 for
his favorable testimony (or some combination of both).
To test whether there is truly a “silence penalty,” Professor Bellin conducted a
more nuanced experiment, giving “jurors” trial scenarios in which (1) the defendant did not testify, or (2) the defendant testified but added “no new information”
and gave testimony that was merely “consistent with that of” an alibi witness who
said he was watching a baseball game with the defendant at the time of the
crime.185 The result was that “jurors” found 76% of the non-testifying defendants
guilty but only 62% of the testifying defendants guilty, a statistically significant
result.186
That said, it still would be difficult to characterize the defendant’s alibi testimony in Professor Bellin’s study as anything other than favorable. First, the
defendant’s testimony provided corroboration for his alibi witness.187 Second, and
maybe more importantly, participants were not told that the prosecution undermined the defendant’s testimony during cross-examination,188 which would imply
that the State had nothing to challenge the defense’s corroborated alibi narrative.
Therefore, again, it is still impossible to say whether the participants in Professor
Bellin’s study were punishing the one defendant’s silence or rewarding the other
defendant’s testimony (or, again, some combination of both).
Professor Bellin also analyzed data collected from a 2000-2001 National Center
for State Courts (“NCSC”) survey of “attorneys, judges and jurors participating in
felony cases at four sites: Los Angeles, Phoenix, the District of Columbia, and the

182. Id. at 408 (construing David R. Shaffer & Thomas Case, On the Decision to Testify in One’s Own Behalf:
Effects of Withheld Evidence, Defendant’s Sexual Preferences, and Juror Dogmatism on Juridic Decisions, 42 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 335, 339 (1982)).
183. Id. at 409.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 412–13.
186. Id. The 62% conviction rate was for defendants who were not impeached with evidence of prior
convictions. Id. The conviction rates were 82% for a testifying defendant who was impeached with a prior
robbery conviction and 73% for a testifying defendant who was impeached with a prior criminal fraud
conviction. Id.
187. See id.
188. See id.
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Bronx.”189 The data revealed that, for defendants without prior convictions, 41%
of testifying defendants were found guilty while 70% of non-testifying defendants
were found guilty.190
Again, this data tends to support the existence of a “silence penalty” but with
caveats. First, like the Professor Shaffer and Bellin studies show, it is unclear
whether or to what extent jurors were punishing defendants who did not testify as
opposed to rewarding defendants who did testify. Second, in these real-world cases,
there could be any number of variables that might explain the differences in conviction rates between testifying and non-testifying defendants. For example, it would
be unsurprising if, in the NCSC cases, defendants testified more in cases in which
the State had weaker evidence of guilt while defendants testified less in cases in
which the State had stronger evidence of guilt. If this were true, it would be an
example of correlation rather than causation and would not establish a “silence penalty.” Of course, it is entirely possible that the NCSC cases do show a “silence penalty,” but there is simply no way to reach such a conclusion definitively.
Finally, Professor Bellin cited to a public opinion poll asking whether a defendant who invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is probably guilty or simply exercising a right.191 50% of those surveyed responded
“probably guilty,” 36% responded “simply exercising a right,” and 14% responded
“not sure.”192 Again, this squares with the general supposition that there probably
is a “silence penalty” but does not definitively tell us how these respondents would
deliberate or reach a verdict in an actual trial.
ii. Does the “No Adverse Inference” Instruction Help or Hurt Defendants?
The second assumption to test, and the question at the heart of Lakeside v.
Oregon, is whether “no adverse inference” instructions help or hurt defendants. As
is clear from both Lakeside and Carter, “the tool courts consider the most effective
to prevent prejudice resulting from the absence of a defendant’s testimony at trial
is an instruction to the jury that it should not draw an adverse inference therefrom.”193 Conversely, “attorneys often decide not to request such an instruction
because [they think] it calls attention to the defendant’s silence.”194 Given that
roughly 50% of criminal defendants do not testify,195 one might imagine that there

189. Id. at 415.
190. Id. at 420–21.
191. Id. at 407–8.
192. Id. at 408.
193. Sarah E. West, “The Blindfold on Justice is Not a Gag”: The Case for Allowing Controlled Questioning
of Witnesses by Jurors, 38 TULSA L. REV. 529, 547 (2003).
194. Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Michaelwicz v. State, 186 S.W.3d
601, 624 n.12 (Tex. App. 2006).
195. See Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior
Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1371 (2009)
(finding that 49.4% of defendants in the same NCSC study cited by Professor Bellin testified); see also Jeffrey
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are a number of experiments testing whether a “no adverse inference” instruction
is helpful or harmful to these non-testifying defendants.
Surprisingly, however, there are no experiments to date actually testing the efficacy of the “no adverse inference” instruction. In The Defendant’s Testimony,
Professor Shaffer purports to cite to a study that found that “juries instructed not to
draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s Fifth Amendment plea were no more
likely to convict the accused than were juries receiving no judicial commentary on
the meaning and use of the privilege.”196 That study, however, was actually an
unpublished thesis by a University of Georgia graduate student in which “jurors”
in an experiment either were or were not given a jury instruction when a defendant
testified on direct examination and then sought to invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination on cross-examination.197 The study therefore
cannot tell us anything about the effectiveness of a “no adverse inference” instruction when a defendant does not take the witness stand at all.
b. Assumptions About Jury Conduct Related to Implicit Bias
There are two corollary assumptions to test in the context of juror implicit bias:
(1) whether jurors draw adverse inferences based on the races of the defendant
and/or the victim; and (2) whether an implicit bias jury instruction would mitigate
this bias, or, conversely, cause a “boomerang effect.”
i. Do Jurors Notice and Hold Race Against Defendants?
There is robust evidence that jurors draw adverse inferences based on the
defendant’s race. Numerous experiments have shown “that the race of the defendant significantly and directly affects the determination of guilt,” with white
“jurors” in these experiments being “more likely to find a minority-race defendant
guilty than they were to find an identically situated white defendant guilty.”198
One particularly strong experiment shows the bilateral nature of bias based on
the respective races of the “jurors” and “defendants.” In this experiment, Professor
Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu conducted two trials, one with white “jurors” and
one with Black “jurors.”199 These “jurors” read the transcript of a simulated rape
case, and two of the variables in the study were (1) the race of the defendant; and

Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules that Encourage Defendants to Testify,
76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 852 n.1 (2008).
196. David R. Shaffer, The Defendant’s Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL
PROCEDURE 124, 147 n.1 (Saul M. Kassim & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985).
197. E.G. Clary, The effects of a defendant’s prior record and evidence withholding on juridic judgments
(1978) (Master’s thesis, Univ. of Georgia).
198. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH L. REV. 1611, 1626 (1985) (citing
nine such studies).
199. Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal
Responsibility, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133, 136, 141 (1979).
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(2) the amount of evidence pointing toward guilt (near-zero, marginal, or
strong).200
For the white “jurors,” “[w]hen the evidence was [either] strong or near-zero the
subjects rated the defendants, irrespective of race, as equally culpable.”201
Conversely, “when the evidence was marginal a [B]lack defendant was rated as
significantly more culpable by the subject-jurors than a white defendant.”202
Meanwhile, the Black “jurors” rated the defendants as equally culpable in the condition where there was near-zero evidence of guilt.203 On the other hand, the Black
“jurors” rated the white defendants as significantly more culpable than their Black
counterparts in both the marginal and strong evidence scenarios.204
Professor Ugwuegbu concluded that:
The bias effects found for the marginal evidence are particularly very significant because it is exactly these middling cases that get to the courts. Cases
where the evidence is weak are likely to be dropped by the prosecution, while
cases where the evidence is very strong are likely to be plea-bargained by the
defense. Kalven and Zeisel (1966) noted the bias effect of middling cases in
their field work. They concluded that when there was doubt as to evidence the
juror was liberated from factual constraints and as a result more likely to be
influenced by affective factors. The present data supported Kalven and
Zeisel’s liberation hypothesis.205

This liberation hypothesis posits “that when cases are close on the evidence, juries
are ‘liberated’ from the dictates of the law and use extralegal factors, like criminal
and gender stereotypes, in arriving at verdicts.”206 This hypothesis is also consistent with the “modern racism perspective, which suggests that discriminatory
behavior will only occur when it can be justified on nonracial grounds.”207
To test this modern racism perspective, Professor James D. Johnson conducted
an experiment with primarily white students from southeastern North Carolina.208
Professor Johnson gave the students a fictional case in which a robber stole $650
from a bank, with the police soon thereafter arresting a defendant with $630 in

200. Id. at 136–37.
201. Id. at 139.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 142.
204. Id. at 141–42 (“In other words, the [B]lack subjects tended to grant the [B]lack defendant the benefit of
the doubt not only when the evidence was doubtful but even when there was strong evidence against him.”).
205. Id. at 143.
206. See Valerie Gray Hardcastle, M.K. Kitzmiller & Shelby Lahey, The Impact of Neuroscience Data in
Criminal Cases: Female Defendants and the Double-Edged Sword, 21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 291, 293 (Spring
2018) (summarizing Kalven and Zeisel’s theory); see also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 164-66 (1996).
207. James D. Johnson, Erik Whitestone, Lee Anderson Jackson & Leslie Gatto, Justice is Still Not
Colorblind: Differential Racial Effects of Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 893, 896 (1995).
208. Id. at 894–95.
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cash who explained that he got the money from a loan shark.209 One of the variables in the experiment was the defendant’s race.210 The other variable involved a
wiretap recording in which the loan shark said he would never loan money to the
defendant.211 The students either (1) were not told about the recording, (2) were
told about the recording, or (3) were told about the recording and also told that the
wiretap was illegal and to ignore the recording as evidence.212 Finally, Professor
Johnson asked the students to rate the defendant’s culpability on a 9-point scale,
with 1 representing “definitely innocent” and 9 representing “definitely guilty.”213
There was no statistically significant difference in the level of culpability that
the students assigned to the defendants as a function of race in the conditions in
which they were merely told or not told about the wiretap recording.214 But there
was a statistically significant difference in the average culpability score when students were told about the wiretap recording but also told to ignore it as evidence:
6.1 for the Black defendant versus 5.1 for the white defendant.215 Professor
Johnson concluded that these results confirmed the modern racism perspective,
with the students in the illegal wiretap condition able to “justify the high verdict
scores given to the Black defendant on nonracial grounds (i.e., not allowing a
guilty person to go free, etc.).”216
Furthermore, decades of trial data suggests that jurors draw adverse inferences
from a defendant’s race. Specifically, “[s]everal studies of conviction rate data find
that [B]lack defendants are significantly more likely to be found guilty than are
white defendants charged with the same crime.”217 Moreover, as compared to conviction rates for white defendants, “[c]onviction rates of African American defendants are higher, particularly when the victim is white.”218
Experiments have also shown that the victim’s race (and the respective races of
the defendant and the victim) impacts the determination of guilt, at least in certain
cases. For example, in the aforementioned experiment by Professor Ugwuegbu
involving the rape “trial,” another variable was the victim’s race.219 For white
“jurors,” “[w]hen the rape involved a white victim, the subjects rated the offense
209.
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as more culpable;” for Black “jurors,” “[w]hen the victim of the rape was white the
subjects rated the offense as less culpable.”220
Meanwhile, in another experiment, Professors Kitty Klein and Blanche Creech
conducted an experiment in which they told students that, inter alia, (1) a male defendant was charged with rape, murder, burglary, or the sale of drugs; and (2) the
female victim was either Black or white.221 For the rape, murder, and burglary conditions, the students thought that the defendant was more likely to be guilty when
the victim was a white woman; for the drug crime, the race of the victim did not
have a significant impact on the students’ guilt ratings.222
Overall, then, there appears to be relatively conclusive evidence that jurors do
draw adverse inferences based on the respective races of the defendant and the
victim.
ii. Do Implicit Bias Jury Instructions Help or Hurt Defendants?
Unlike with the “no adverse inference” instruction, there is some evidence about
the possible effect of jury instructions on racial bias, but it is sparse. To date, there
has been (a) one experiment about whether a sympathy/prejudice instruction helps
or hurts defendants and (b) one similar experiment about an implicit bias jury
instruction.
(a) The Sympathy/Prejudice Instruction Experiment
In 1991, Professors Jeffrey E. Pfeifer and James R.P. Ogloff conducted the first
of these experiments.223 They had 257 white students from a large midwestern university read a nine-page transcript of a rape trial.224 These students were then
assigned to groups with different variables. One of these variables was the race of
the defendant and the race of the victim. The possibilities of this variable were: (1)
Black defendant/Black victim, (2) white defendant/Black victim, (3) Black defendant/white victim, and (4) white defendant/white victim.225
Another variable was that some students received no jury instructions while
other students received jury instructions about the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and sympathy/prejudice, including the following admonition: “You
will allow no sympathy or prejudice to influence you in arriving at your verdict.
The law demands of you a just verdict uninfluenced by sympathy or prejudice or

220. Id. at 139, 141.
221. Kitty Klein & Blanche Creech, Race, Rape, and Bias: Distortion of Prior Odds and Meaning Changes, 3
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 23–24 (1982).
222. Id. at 24.
223. Jeffrey E. Pfeifer & James R.P. Ogloff, Ambiguity and Guilt Determinations: A Modern Racism
Perspective, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1713 (1991).
224. Id. at 1717.
225. Id. at 1718–19.
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any considerations outside the evidence and the law as given you in these
instructions.”226
This admonition is similar to the general sympathy/prejudice instruction that has
largely been rejected by Kansas courts and used intermittently by other courts.
Pfeifer and Ogloff then asked the students about guilt using (1) a 7-point bipolar
rating, with 1 representing “not guilty” and 7 representing “extremely guilty,” and
(2) a “guilty”/“not guilty” dichotomy.227 The results of the 7-point bipolar rating
can be seen in the table below:

Mean Bipolar Ratings of Defendant Guilt
Defendant/Victim Race

No Instructions

Instructions

Black/Black

4.61 (1.70)

3.33 (1.95)

White/Black

4.47 (1.65)

3.63 (2.25)

Black/White

6.00 (0.63)*

3.94 (1.21)

White/White

4.18 (1.33)

3.50 (1.40)

*The guilt rating for the Black defendant/white victim racial combination is significantly higher than all other combinations in the no-instruction cell. Ratings are based
on a 7-point scale with 1 representing “not guilty” and 7 representing “extremely
guilty.” Standard deviations are in parentheses.

As the authors noted, their study “replicate[d] earlier studies in which the highest guilt ratings were found in Black defendant/white victim racial combination”:
6.00 vs. 4.18, 4.47, and 4.61 for the other three conditions, a statistically significant
result.228 However, “the addition of jury instructions play[ed] a significant role in
dissipating differential guilt ratings based on the race of the defendant and the victim.”229 Namely, the instructions significantly lowered the guilt rating in the Black
defendant/white victim condition to 3.94, which was still higher than the rating in
the other three conditions but not to a statistically significant degree.230
Meanwhile, here were the results of the dichotomous “guilty”/“not guilty”
rating:
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Dichotomous Ratings of Defendant Guilt
Defendant/Victim Race

No Instructions
Guilty/Not Guilty

Instructions
Guilty/Not Guilty

Black/Black

9 (50%)/9 (50%)

6 (60%)/9 (40%)

White/Black

6 (46%)/7 (54%)

7 (47%)/8 (53%)

Black/White

15 (83%)/3 (17%)*

6 (38%)/10 (62%)

White/White

7 (44%)/9 (56%)

6 (54%)/5 (46%)

*The guilt rating for the Black defendant/white victim racial combination, when no
instructions are given, is significantly different from all other combinations at the .05
level of significance.

The authors again noted that their study “replicate[d] earlier studies in which the
highest guilt ratings were found in the Black defendant/white victim racial combination.”231 And they again observed that “the addition of jury instructions play[ed]
a significant role in dissipating differential guilt ratings based on the race of the defendant and the victim.”232 Specifically, while the highest percentage of uninstructed jurors “convicted” the “defendant” in the Black defendant/white victim
condition (83%), the lowest percentage of instructed “jurors” convicted the “defendant” in that same condition (38%).233
The authors speculated that “these differential guilt ratings may be due to the
fact that instructions remove much of the ambiguity from a participant’s decision
on guilt.”234 Specifically, the instructions possibly “provide[d] participants with
guidelines that enable[d] them to focus on legally relevant information such as the
elements of the crime rather than on their prejudicial attitudes when evaluating the
guilt of the defendant.”235 The authors then concluded that this result would be
“clearly consistent with the theory of modern racism which asserts that expressions
of racism are most likely to be exhibited in ambiguous situations.”236
Of course, this experiment has an important limitation: the differential guilt ratings were given by subjects who (1) on the one hand were given no jury instructions; and (2) on the other hand, were given a sympathy/prejudice instruction and
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt instructions. Therefore, it is
231.
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impossible to say whether the differential guilt ratings were based on the sympathy/prejudice instruction, the other instructions, or some combination. That said,
the sympathy/prejudice instruction was the only instruction having an arguable
bearing on the races of the defendant and victim while the other two jury instructions were generic instructions with no obvious racial overtones. As a result, it
seems likely, but not definitive, that the sympathy/prejudice instruction mitigated
racial prejudice in some meaningful sense.
(b) The Implicit Bias Instruction Experiment
The second experiment tested the efficacy of an implicit bias jury instruction. In
2015, Dr. Jennifer K. Elek and Paula Hannaford-Agor worked with the National
Center for State Courts to recruit a participant group that “reflected the demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the broader national population.”237 The
researchers then had participants read a mock trial scenario involving a defendant
charged with assault and battery with intent to cause serious bodily injury after a
locker room fight with his college basketball teammate.238 Those participants were
assigned to conditions where (1) the race of the defendant and victim varied,
and (2) the jury instructions were either generic or included an implicit bias
instruction.239
237. Jennifer K. Elek & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Implicit Bias and the American Juror, 51 CT. REV 116, 120
(2015).
238. Id. at 118.
239. Id. at 120. The implicit bias jury instruction stated:
Our system of justice depends on the willingness and ability of judges like me and jurors like you
to make careful and fair decisions. What we are asked to do is difficult because of a universal challenge: We all have biases. We each make assumptions and have our own stereotypes, prejudices,
and fears. These biases can influence how we categorize the information we take in. They can
influence the evidence we see and hear, and how we perceive a person or a situation. They can
affect the evidence we remember and how we remember it. And they can influence the “gut feelings” and conclusions we form about people and events. When we are aware of these biases, we
can at least try to fight them. But we are often not aware that they exist.
We can only correct for hidden biases when we recognize them and how they affect us. For this
reason, you are encouraged to thoroughly and carefully examine your decision-making process to
ensure that the conclusions you draw are a fair reflection of the law and the evidence. Please examine your reasoning for possible bias by reconsidering your first impressions of the people and evidence in this case. Is it easier to believe statements or evidence when presented by people who are
more like you? If you or the people involved in this case were from different backgrounds—richer
or poorer, more or less educated, older or younger, or of a different gender, race, religion, or sexual orientation—would you still view them, and the evidence, the same way?
Please also listen to the other jurors during deliberations, who may be from different backgrounds
and who will be viewing this case in light of their own insights, assumptions, and even biases.
Listening to different perspectives may help you to better identify the possible effects these hidden
biases may have on decision-making.
Our system of justice relies on each of us to contribute toward a fair and informed verdict in this
case. Working together, we can reach a fair result.
Id. at 119–20.
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The researchers, however, were not able to replicate “the traditional baseline
pattern of ‘white juror bias’ (i.e., the higher rate of guilty verdicts and harsher sentences for Black defendants in control conditions) observed in prior similar studies,
which precluded a complete test of the value of the specialized instruction.”240
Instead, “white participants across all conditions . . . convicted white defendants at
a slightly higher rate (65%) than [B]lack defendants (59%), although this difference was not statistically significant.”241 Notably, the researchers “also did not
observe any clear evidence of ‘backlash effects’ (in which mock jurors might seem
to treat [B]lack defendants more harshly) after hearing an implicit-bias instruction,
but small sample sizes limited these analyses.”242
Some evidence suggests that jurors draw adverse inferences based on a defendant’s silence, and comparatively stronger evidence suggests that jurors draw
adverse inferences based upon the races of the defendant and victim. Meanwhile,
there have been no experiments testing the efficacy of the accepted “no adverse inference” instruction, while two experiments provide some proof that jury instructions can reduce implicit bias by jurors or at least not have a boomerang effect on
jurors. While Lakeside stands for the proposition that assumptions about jury
behavior should not be the basis for decisions about constitutional law, a test of
these respective assumptions supplies stronger support for an implicit bias jury
instruction than a “no adverse inference” instruction.
D. The Possibility of a More Limited Right to an Implicit Bias Jury Instruction
If courts were to accept the logic of this Article, judges would need to issue
implicit bias jury instructions on demand, just as they need to issue a “no adverse
inference” instruction whenever a non-testifying defendant requests one. A defendant would have a constitutional right to such an instruction without needing to
show a specific reason to believe that racial bias would infect his trial.
Alternatively, if courts were to reject a categorical right to an implicit bias jury
instruction, they should still acknowledge a limited right to such an instruction in
certain cases. Support for this more limited right can be found in a line of Supreme
Court cases dealing with the right to question prospective jurors about racial bias
during voir dire.
1. Ham v. South Carolina and the Due Process Right to Special Voir Dire
Questioning Regarding Racial Bias
The first of these cases is Ham v. South Carolina.243 In Ham, Gene Ham, a
bearded Black civil rights activist, was charged with possession of marijuana in
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Florence, South Carolina.244 Before the judge’s voir dire examination of prospective jurors, defense counsel requested that the judge ask them questions, such as
(1) “Would you fairly try this case on the basis of the evidence and disregarding
the defendant’s race,” (2) “You have no prejudice against . . . [B]lack people? You
would not be influenced by the use of the term ‘[B]lack,’” and (3) “Would you disregard the fact that this defendant wears a beard in deciding this case?”245 The
judge declined to ask these questions but did ask jurors:
1. Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant, Gene Ham?
2. Are you conscious of any bias or prejudice for or against him?
3. Can you give the State and the defendant a fair and impartial trial?246

After Ham was convicted, he appealed, claiming that these general questions
were insufficient and that he had a constitutional right to more specific questions
about racial (and beard) bias.247 The State countered by contending:
The general statutory inquiries made by the Trial Judge sufficiently covered
those specific inquiries sought by the defense. The defendant was in Court,
within sight of the jury, when the statutory inquiries were made. It was
obvious to the jury and all present that the defendant was black and bearded.
The redundancy of asking a prospective juror on his voir dire, “Are you conscious of any bias or prejudice for or against him?,” “him” being the black,
bearded defendant at whom the juror is looking; then to ask, “Are you conscious of any bias or prejudice against black people who wear beards?” would
appear to be not only unnecessary but ridiculous.248

The Supreme Court sided with Ham on the questions regarding racial bias,249 finding that the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment were to ensure the “essential
demands of fairness” and “prohibit the States from invidiously discriminating on
the basis of race.”250 Based on these twin purposes, the Court was able to conclude
“that the Fourteenth Amendment required the judge in this case to interrogate the
jurors upon the subject of racial prejudice.”251 And while the Court did not find
that the trial judge needed to use the specific questions proposed by defense counsel, it found that the general question that the judge asked about bias or prejudice

244. Id. at 524–25.
245. Id. at 525 n.2.
246. Id. at 526 & n.3.
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248. Brief of Respondent at 3–4, Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (No. 71-5139), 1972 WL
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against the defendant was insufficient to survive scrutiny under the Due Process
Clause.252
Ham thus stands for two propositions: (1) there is a constitutionally meaningful
difference between general questions about bias/prejudice and specific questions
about racial bias, and (2) there are some cases in which a defendant has a due process right to specific voir dire questions about racial bias. This first proposition
relates back to the argument some courts have advanced that the issuance of a sympathy/prejudice jury instruction obviates the need for an implicit bias instruction.253 Unless there is reason to believe that it is more important to question
prospective jurors about racial bias than it is to instruct actual jurors about such
bias, Ham should be extended to require implicit bias jury instructions in certain
cases. But which cases?
2. Ristaino v. Ross and the “Inextricably Bound” Test
The Supreme Court answered this question regarding the breadth of Ham in its
subsequent opinion in Ristaino v. Ross.254 In Ristaino, three Black defendants
unsuccessfully sought voir dire questioning of prospective jurors about racial bias
at their trial for violent crimes against a white security guard.255 The Supreme
Court ultimately affirmed the decision to preclude such questioning, concluding
that “Ham did not announce a requirement of universal applicability.”256
Instead, the Ristaino Court construed Ham as “reflect[ing] an assessment of
whether under all of the circumstances presented there was a constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial prejudice, the jurors would
not be as ‘indifferent as [they stand] unsworne.’”257 Specifically, special jury questioning was required “to meet the constitutional requirement that an impartial jury
be impaneled” in Ham, because the defendant claimed he was framed based on his
civil rights activities, meaning “[r]acial issues . . . were inextricably bound up with
the conduct of the trial.”258 Conversely, the Ristaino Court held that “[t]he mere
fact that the victim of the crimes alleged was a white man and the defendants were
[Black]” was not enough to require special jury questioning.259
Since Ham and Ristaino, courts have focused upon the question of whether
issues of race are “inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial” to decide
whether the Due Process Clause mandates special voir dire questions about racial
bias. For example, in People v. Wilborn, a Black defendant charged with cocaine
possession claimed that the white officers who seized the cocaine “fabricated the
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basis for their traffic stop and detention.”260 In finding that the trial judge’s refusal
to allow specific questions about racial bias during voir dire violated the Due
Process Clause, the Court of Appeal of California concluded that “where the
defense by a [Black] defendant rested entirely on a credibility challenge to the
white police officers, the court had an obligation to make some inquiry as to racial
bias of the prospective jurors.”261
Conversely, in United States v. Brown, a defendant convicted of uttering and
passing an altered note claimed a due process violation because (1) he was denied
special voir dire questioning regarding racial bias, and (2) he was “a young [B]lack
male whereas all of the government’s witnesses and all of the jurors were
white.”262 While the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that,
“[u]nder such circumstances, we recognize that voir dire on the issue of race may
be advisable,” it did not find that such questioning was constitutionally mandated.263 Instead, the court concluded that “[t]he mere fact that a defendant is [B]
lack does not alone trigger the special questioning requirement found in Ham and
Turner.”264
3. Turner v. Murray and Interracial Capital Cases
The Turner opinion referenced by the court in Brown involves the one situation
in which special voir dire questioning about racial bias is constitutionally required
without delving into the details of the case. In Turner v. Murray, a Black man was
charged with the capital murder of a white storekeeper and unsuccessfully sought
special voir dire, including the following question: “Will these facts [about the
defendant’s and victim’s respective races] prejudice you against Willie Lloyd
Turner or affect your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on
the evidence?”265
After the jury convicted and sentenced Turner to death, the defendant appealed,
and eventually his case reached the United States Supreme Court.266 In concluding
“that a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is [per se] entitled to have
prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of
racial bias,” the Court focused on the potential for implicit racial bias in a capital
case.267 According to the Court:
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing
hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but
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remain undetected. On the facts of this case, a juror who believes that [Black
people] are violence prone or morally inferior might well be influenced by
that belief in deciding whether petitioner’s crime involved the aggravating
factors specified under Virginia law. Such a juror might also be less favorably
inclined toward petitioner’s evidence of mental disturbance as a mitigating
circumstance. More subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes could also
influence a juror’s decision in this case. Fear of [Black people], which could
easily be stirred up by the violent facts of petitioner’s crime, might incline a
juror to favor the death penalty.268

Notably, the Turner holding partially mirrors the previously mentioned federal
statute—18 U.S.C. § 3593(f)—which requires a jury instruction regarding racial
and other biases during the sentencing phase of a capital case.269
Even if the courts do not accept the argument for a categorical right to an
implicit bias jury instruction, they should recognize a more limited right to such an
instruction based on the Ham line of cases. Under this more limited right, a defendant would have the right to an implicit bias jury instruction in the same cases in
which he would have the right to special voir dire questioning of prospective jurors
about racial bias. Specifically, this more limited right would allow for a jury
instruction on implicit bias in (1) cases in which racial issues are inextricably
bound up with the conduct of the trial, and (2) interracial capital cases.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to prevent jurors from holding
defendants’ silence against them. In a trilogy of opinions, the Court concluded that
when a defendant refrains from testifying, (1) the prosecutor and judge cannot
make adverse comments about that decision; (2) the judge can give a “no adverse
inference” instruction even over a defense objection; and (3) the judge must give a
“no adverse inference” instruction upon a defense request. Conversely, the Court
has never ruled that jurors can impeach their verdict based upon jurors holding a
defendant’s silence against him, and lower courts have ruled against recognizing
such a right to jury impeachment.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of juror racial bias in
reverse. In 2017, the Court ruled in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado that jurors must
be allowed to impeach their verdict based on jurors holding a defendant’s race
against him.270 But the Court has never held that there is a right to an implicit bias
jury instruction, and no lower court has ever recognized such a right.
In Pena-Rodriguez, however, the Supreme Court clearly recognized that the
right to an impartial jury not only addresses “unique historical, constitutional, and
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institutional concerns,” but also requires “[a] constitutional rule.”271 Specifically,
the Pena-Rodriguez Court concluded that “[a] constitutional rule that racial bias in
the justice system must be addressed—including, in some instances, after the verdict has been entered—is necessary to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in jury
verdicts, a confidence that is a central premise of the Sixth Amendment trial
right.”272
This Article contends that this rule must go further and address juror racial bias
on both the back end and the front end. For the same reasons that the Supreme
Court created the right to a jury instruction that jurors must not hold a defendant’s
silence against him, it should recognize the right to a jury instruction that jurors
must not hold a defendant’s race against him.273 Moreover, even if the courts do
not recognize a categorical right to an implicit bias jury instruction, they should
recognize a more limited right to such an instruction based on Ham and its
progeny.
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